

Russia's Nonproliferation Policy

(An Overview)



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Changed nature of the nonproliferation regime:

- Proliferation of technology
- Energy deficit, interest in nuclear power
- International system less manageable



- Competing demands, need to balance interests
- Russia is not the Soviet Union: different interests, different capabilities



At the official level, Russia's nonproliferation policy is impeccable:

- 2000 National Security Concept: proliferation is No. 5 among external threats
- Security Council meeting on nonproliferation (December 2003): proliferation tops threats along with international terrorism
- Foundations of State Policy on WMD Nonproliferation (2005): one of key threats of the 21st century
- National Security Strategy, 2009: one of key threats to Russia's security, including military security



Challenges of the 1990s cleared in early 2000s.


June 2006: White Paper on Nonproliferation (Military Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation)

РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ И СИТУАЦИЯ В ОБЛАСТИ НЕРАСПРОСТРАНЕНИЯ ОРУЖИЯ МАССОВОГО УНИЧТОЖЕНИЯ И СРЕДСТВ ЕГО ДОСТАВКИ: УГРОЗЫ, ОЦЕНКИ, ЗАДАЧИ И ПУТИ ИХ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ

ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ

Открытость любого государства в отношении своих
области международной безопасности является важнейшей
укрепления доверия, повышения предсказуемости в межгосударственных
делах, содействия многосторонним решениям по проблемам
Концепция национальной безопасности, Концепция внешней
Военная доктрина Российской Федерации являются основными
программными документами, в которых закреплены такие принципы

Настоящая публикация посвящена одному из важнейших
области международной безопасности - нераспространению оружия
уничтожения (ОМУ) и средств его доставки. Эта тематика в 1990-е



Supports traditional nonproliferation
(NPT, MTCR, CWC, BWC)

State-driven proliferation seen as
main threat. Acquisition of WMD by
terrorists seen a less likely threat

Export control primary means of
stemming proliferation. Russian
export control system regarded as
adequate and robust; could be
enhanced through greater
cooperation with other post-Soviet
states.

Concern about perceived use of
nonproliferation for unrelated goals

- Iraq
- State-level approach to
safeguards



Nuclear exports

- Selective trade: excesses of 1990s (e.g. sale of centrifuges to Iran) are in the past
- Selective support of US: supported limitations on spread of enrichment technologies and multinational nuclear fuel cycle because they promise expanded business. Launched International Enrichment Center at Angarsk. Supports development of new generation reactors




Suspects that US initiatives might squeeze Russia from global nuclear market:

Supports US-Indian agreement

Suspects US plans to take Indian market for itself (concern overstated)

Suspects US nonproliferation policy is a cover for expansion of US influence:

- War in Iraq under pretext of proliferation by Saddam Hussein
- US overlooks nuclear status Israel and Pakistan
- North Korea: a crisis of US making
- New crisis spot – Iran. US refused to improve relations with Iran, refuses to give security guarantees, refuses direct negotiations



Almost all crisis spots are near Russia. Fraught with conflicts and establishment of US bases near Russian territory

Iran

- Concern over Iranian nuclear and (to smaller extent) missile programs.
- Cooperates with U.S. and the EU to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, limits cooperation to areas not prohibited by international law.
- Seeks to avoid excessive economic and political losses (Bushehr, Caspian Sea)



"I looked into Putin's eyes and saw a reflection of George W. Bush"

Russian nuclear energy complex is primarily export-oriented.

Built two reactors in China at Tyanvan (completion 2007), one in Iran (Bushehr), two in India (Kudamkulan).

Plan – 21 reactors in 9 countries

(reduction of earlier plans for 35 reactors in 19 countries)

19 have been contracted:

Four in China

Four in India

Two in Belarus

One in Armenia

Two in Ukraine

Two in Vietnam


Four in Turkey




Глобальность будет обеспечена за счет роста портфеля проектов сооружения АЭС, развития зарубежных операций и активов



Доля выручки от зарубежных операций



Доля выручки от зарубежных активов



Портфель проектов сооружения АЭС за рубежом (ЕРС и ВОО)



Other cooperation projects



- Kiriyenko in January 2006: restore MinSredMash, the Soviet nuclear complex. Includes uranium ore supplies from Central Asia.
- Agreement with Australia on purchases of natural uranium
- 1-2-3 Agreement with the United States finally ratified after a delay in 2008-10. Agreement for supply of enriched uranium for fuel
- Cooperation with Siemens and Toshiba
- Main foreign markets: Southeast Asia, China, India.

Reform of Russian nuclear industry: build a profit-generating corporation.



- Consolidation of key assets for construction of reactors, production of fuel, production of equipment. Outside financing plan has so far failed: government will provide 1 trillion rubles until 2015.
- 16 percent of Russia's energy balance
- up to 30 percent by 2030.
- 8 percent of global uranium extraction
- 40 percent of global uranium enrichment
- 17 percent of global nuclear fuel

Currently - 10 NPPs, 33 reactors

13 reactors under construction, 8 more planned

2 floating reactors

Disarmament

Adheres to about same policy as US (and, to an extent, other NWS) on disarmament: stall, pursue optimization instead of disarmament.

Concluded New START in 2010; reluctant to pursue subsequent reductions without solving other issues (MD, etc.)

Insists next stage should be multilateral (N-5).



Other areas (FMCT, weapons in space) – takes positive stance. Closely cooperates with US on some issues, critical on other.

Ended agreement on CTR, but favors joint CTR-type programs with US in other countries.

Future Russian Policy:

- Will oppose WMD proliferation
- Will remain wary of US motives and US-supplied evidence of proliferation activities by other states
- Will emphasize diplomatic instruments
- Will pursue economic opportunities, oppose sanctions against regime violators (but will support tough approach to countries of little economic interest)
- Will insist on being part of multilateral efforts.
- Will oppose use of force and all proposals to use force in the name of nonproliferation.
- Will never allow conflicts over proliferation get out of hand and affect core interest in relations with the West

